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PRELIMINARY NOTES ON STRUCTURAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY 
GUATEMALA EARTHQUAKES OF 4 AND 6 FEBRUARY 1976 
by 
Mete A. Sozen* and Jose Roesset*i( 
Notes based on inspection of urban construction during 8-14 Feb. 1976 for 
the Panel on Earthquakes, Committee on Natural Disasters of the Commission on 
Sociotechnical Systems, National Research Council o 
Guatemala - 42,000 sq. miles (size of Tennessee). Sea level to 13,000 ft. 
Population was 4,300,000 in 1964 census. Projected to 1976, 5,600,000. G.N.P. 
$1.5 x 109 (1967). Mean G.N.P. increase 5% 1950 to 1967. Per capita income: 
$85 - farmers, $2,200 - upper 7% of urban population (1967). Economy primarily 
agricultural. Exports coffee (50% of all), cotton (20%), sugar, bananas, and 
beef. Unfavorable trade balance during 1960's. 
Guatemala City - See map. Population 814,000 in 1964 census with a density 
of approximately 1,000 persons per sq. mile. Projected (1976) over one million. 
City grew~by 85% between 1950 and 1964. Elevation 5,000 ft. Surrounded by 
mountains, including a few active volcanoes, and serrated by ravines. 
Soils - To 10 or 15 meters: clay changing to silty sand. To 100 meters: 
volcanic ash. Allowable soil pressure from 15 tons/m2 to 30 tons/m2. Ninety 
degree cuts. 
Structural History - As would be expected, nonengineered construction dom-
inates the one- to three-stories category. (50% of housing substandard accord-
ing to Guatemalan 1964 census.) 9ity also has two dozen buildings in the 10-
to 25-story range. Almost all were well designed and well built in the 1960's 
and 1970's. Many buildings four to nine stories. MOst well conceived, some 
very poor. No building code. When used, ACI 318 with chronologically pertinent 
*Department of Civil Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 
~-kDepartment of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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zone-3 requirements. ACI 318-71 not yet popular because of obfuscation factor. 
Deformed bars with few exceptions. Grade 40 (current construction tends to 60). 
Concrete 3,000 - 5,000 psi. Frame, in various disguises, is the norm. The 
waffle quite common in heavy construction. Relationship between architect and 
engineer difficult to comprehend. Possible cases of architect changing struc-
tural scheme or elements during construction. 
Seismic History - City demolished previously in a series of quakes which 
started in December 1917 and continued into 1918. 
Year 
1530 
1560 
1585 
1607 
1651 
1684 
1689 
1717 
1751 
1757 
1765 
1773 
1798 
1846 
1854 
1863 
1902 
1907 
1917 
1918 
1942 
"Greatll Earthquakes 
Location 
Central Region (from Antigua to Quezaltenango) 
" " 
" II 
II II 
II II 
" II 
Antigua 
Central Region and Antigua 
Antigua 
Central Region 
Central Region and Quezaltenango 
Antigua (Capital moved to Guatemala City) 
Guatemala City 
" II 
Central Region 
Guatemala City 
Quezaltenango (demolished the town) 
Guatemala City 
II " 
" II 
Central Region 
Earthquakes of 4 and 6 February 1976 - Major damage caused on 4th but that 
on 6th had considerable influence. In fact, structural damage increased daily 
at a perceptible rate to 14 February. Epicenter of 4 February event (3AM) was 
still uncertain (Latitude 15.70 - Longitude 89.20 , ?) but location of surface 
fault, inaccurately sketched on "map, makes epicenter unimportant. Observed 
relative motion along the fault 60 to 120 cm. Magnitude 7.5 (from surface 
waves?). May have lasted about 30 sec. The event on 6 February was not as strong 
but did cause additional damage. Ground motion not measured for either quake. 
Reportedly, instrument out of order for first (no paper). Second occurred when 
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it was being reloaded. One seismoscope record south of city, salvaged by Chuck 
Knudson, may provide an indication of maximum acceleration. 
Mercalli - VIII to IX (our estimate) 
Cost of the damage - Not yet established in the city (February 14). Figures 
of $600,000,000 to $800,000,000 have been mentioned (to be compared with G.N.P. 
of $1,500,000,000 in 1967). We think that there is more damage to buildings 
than meets the eye. Cost of repair will depend critically on the selected de-
sign earthquake and how rigidly a code will be enforced. Local engineers and 
authorities calm, not ready to rush to a punitive code. 
Soil Effects - If the ground motion varied throughout the town as a result 
of soil depth or properties, it was not observed by the authors. There was a 
marked change in the extent of damage from the north to the south end of town, 
at least in the districts visited, but this could be attributed to the quality 
of construction and distance from the fault, in that order. 
Soil Failures - There were slides at the top edges of ravines (very steep) 
and severe cracking indicating imminent slides. Many houses destroyed as a 
result. Aftershocks caused additional slides. Major slides along highways 
(reportedly) covered several cars at a time (especially the major event of 
6 February)c 
One- to Three-Story Buildings - Adobe, brick, bahareque (adobe or brick re-
inforced by wood frame usually having X-bracing). Reinforced brick in a few in-
stances. Primitive timber roof truss. Tiles or corrugated steel sheet roof 
covering. Performance of adobe worst. Destruction not uniform. Typically, 
house at block corners demolished if adobe. Some blocks lost 30%, some less than 
10%. Did not see a completely destroyed block in the city but others did. Re-
ported loss of approximately 60,000 dwelling units in this category. Intact 
survival of an impressive number of units in this class (adobe, etc.) makes one 
wonder if the sustained acceleration in Guatemala City could be over 0.25g. 
Four- to Nine-Story Buildings - Except some disastrous examples of prob-
ably non-engineered construction, all in the frame class with the horizontal 
element typically hidden in the thick slab (the weight problem compensated by 
voids or waffle). Problems in the lower end of this class primarily with 
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"captive colmnns" (coltmJIls partially or totally stiffened by nonstructural walls, 
in one case by a steel cabinet) failing in shear o At least three total collapses 
and many on the brink. Problems in the upper end (of this class) with flexibil-
ity (architecture in shambles) and apparent "exhaustion" (large steel strains 
and therefore cracks) of slab at coltmJIl connections. Permanent displacements. 
Moderate-Rise Buildings .. Heavy construction. Well built. Typically long 
spans (8m or more). Waffle slabs predominant. Frames. Structural walls. One 
steel frame (the highest at 22 stories, in final stages of construction). 
Problems in a few instances with transverse reinforcement in RIC girders and 
short connecting beams. In one case, excessive movement of intact frame de-
stroyed the brick skin although the structure was fine. Serious inclined crack-
ing observed in one major coltmJIl (2.3 by 2.3 meter column, 0.5 mm cracks). 
Guard said cracks existed previously, but were smaller in width. Series of 
failures in the first-story elements of an external Ric truss stiffening a 
building. 
Bridges - One bridge on a curve, down (about 30km from town). A pre-
stressed concrete bridge on tall coltmJIls (post-tensioned main span, approx. 
120 meters) in place but must have moved "sideways" at least six inches during 
quake. A steel bridge also on tall coltmJIls (main span approx. 100 meters) off 
its supports, resting partially on abutment. 
Miscellaneous Observations Ground motion in town must have been less than 
in Managua or San Fernando.. (70, maybe 90%, of HEI Centro" with possibly a 
relatively depressed response in the nearly-constant-acceleration range). 
(1) One of the major buildings has connecting girders, carrying primarily 
earthquake effects, which vary continuously in depth (by a ratio of over two) 
from one column face to the other! (2) One of the collapses was initiated by 
"nonstructural" facade walls terminated at the failure level. Situation exac-
erbated by a variation in stiffness in the horizontal plane again introduced 
by nonstructural elements (the coup de grace being delivered by lack of ade-
quate transverse reinforcement in the columns). (3) The other two collapses 
(and many other imminent ones) are due to unsympathetic symbiosis of structural 
and nonstructural elements. 
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rhe Guatemala experience should make us look to our RiC buildings with 
transverse reinforcement proportioned before the current "exorbitant" require ... 
ments. There is, of course, the hope of discovering that the ground motion in 
the city was so high as to be nonrepeatable or that the web reinforcement pro-
vided was below the threshold, but neither speculation holds much promise on 
the basis of available evidence. 
The observed responses of the steel structure and at least two (which we 
inspected in detail) of the major RIC structures (all three of recent vintage) 
were impeccable. We were told that one of these two RiC structures (19 stories) 
was designed with all the earthquake force assigned to the structural wall, 
despite the presence of a hefty frame. 
Because of the close similarity of the structural types and design proce-
dures in Guatemala to those in the U.S., detailed analysis of their experience 
is essential, despite the lack of a strong-motion record. 
( APPROX. LOCATION 
'" OF SURFACE FAULTING 
[60 em to 120 em] 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report has been prepared to provide a preliminary description 
of the response of engineered construction in Guatemala City to the 
earthquakes of 4 and 6 -February 1976 as evaluated from our observations 
made during the period 8 to 14 February 1976. 
The technical information contained in the report is limited primarily 
to photographic evidence. No quantitative analysis is included. We 
believe that an early release of the available information will be of 
value to emphasize some of the structural phenomena which do not need 
analysis and to put into perspective the level of damage experienced in 
the city. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We acknowledge the cooperation and invaluable help received from 
the Camara Guatemalteca de la Construccion through the Committee for 
Damage Evaluation. Special thanks are due to Engineers Victor Chang 
Liang, Pablo Gutierrez, Juan Jose' Hermosilla, Rodolfo Hermosilla, Luis 
Felipe Merida, Hector Morzon, and Roberto Solis. 
We visited Guatemala City for the Panel on Earthquakes (Chairman: 
P. C. Jennings), Committee on Natural Disasters (Chairman: N.M. Newmark) 
of the Commission on Sociotechnical Systems of the National Research 
Council. This report has been reproduced with support from the National 
Science Foundation (Grant ATA 74-22962). 
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GUATEMALA CITY 
Guatemala City (Fig. 1.1) has served as the capital of Guatemala 
since 1773 when Antigua, the previous capital, was severely damaged by 
an earthquake. From 1821 to 1839, it was the capital of the United 
Provinces of Central America. Since 1839, it has been the capital of the 
Republic of Guatemala, which covers a mountainous area of 42,000 sq. 
miles. 
The population of the city was established as 813,696 with a density 
of 991 persons per square mile in the 1964 census. It is estimated that 
the current population is well over a million. Guatemala City grew by 
85 percent from 1950 to 1964. 
The city is located approximately 1000 miles almost directly south 
of New Orleans at an elevation of 1500 meters in the Valley of the Hermit 
(approximate latitude and longitude: 150 by 91 0 ). 
GEOLOGY AND SOIL CONDITIONS ; 
The geology of Guatemala (Fig. 1.1) shows a marked difference 
between the southern part of the country (including all the Pacific 
Coast), composed of relatively young materials (late tertiary and 
quaternary), and the northern part where basal rock (paleozoic and 
mesozoic) is exposed and folded extensively. The line of demarcation 
between these two parts runs east-west almost exactly along the Motagua 
River fault, where the epicenter of the earthquake has been located and a 
left lateral motion of 60 cm to 120 cm has been observed over some 175 km. 
Four main geomorphological regions are normally considered. The 
first two, corresponding to the southern part of the country (where 
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Guatemala City is located) consist of a chain of volcanoes and volcanic 
rocks (late Tertiary) running south-east, and the coastal plain resulting 
from erosion of these mountains (Quaternary). These two regions extend 
themselves into El Salvador. 
The third region, corresponding to the central and north-central 
part of the country, is'a prolongation of the mountain chain in southern 
Mexico, but the orientation changes from south-east to east in Guatemala. 
This mountain chain is formed of granite, serpentinite and schists, with 
another fold of sedimentary rocks in the north. 
The northernmost part of the country (fourth region) is a sedimentary 
basin of cretaceous origin which was probably at one time part of the 
Gul f of ~1exi co. 
In addition to its great geological interest because of the volcanoes, 
there is in Guatemala a large number of long, straight fault traces. 
While the shape of these faults would suggest a "strike-slip" type of 
motion, historically only "dip-slip" motions had been reported. In the 
present earthquake, however, as mentioned above, a significant left 
lateral motion has been observed along the Motagua River fault. 
Guatemala City is located on a plateau surrounded by mountains, 
including four active volcanoes, and serrated by very deep ravines. The 
basic soil is made of volcanic ash and pumice, down to at least 100 m. 
The top 8 to 15 m are the result of weathering of the volcanic ash, with 
the expected gradual transition from clay (of a brownish color) and 
sometimes organic silts (dark) to silts (yellowish to red), silty sands 
(yellowish, light brown or white) and sands (gray, pink or beige). 
While this profile is typical, the actual soil properties, degree 
of plasticity and water content change appreciably in different parts of 
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of the town. Depth to dense sand may vary from 1 or 2 m to 8 or 9 m, 
increasing generally from the northern part of the city (zone 2 and 
north of zone 1, Fig. 1.2) towards the southern part of zone 1. It is 
about constant in zones 9 to 15 (somewhat deeper in zone 12). Water 
content is higher in zone 8 particularly, as well as in parts of zones 9, 
12 and 14. 
Spread footings with tie beams or strip footings are the usual type 
of foundations in the city. Allowable soil pressure is estimated at 15 
to 30 tons/m2. Ninety-degree cuts are frequent along highways. 
Soil conditions played a clear role in some of the failures and 
damage. There were slides at the top edges of the ravines and many houses 
were destroyed as a result. Slides were also numerous along highways, 
many of them caused by the aftershock of Friday, 6 February, and it was 
reported that several cars had been buried. Large cracks in the ground 
and soil settlement could be observed in various parts (particularly 
across some highways). A television transmitting station on top of a 
mountain had a foundation failure. There was no evidence, however, of 
soil amplification. 
SEISMIC HISTORY 
Guatemala has had a long history of earthquakes and its capitals 
(La Antigua first and Guatemala City since 1773) have been destroyed in 
the past. 
Earthquakes in Guatemala (affecting Guatemala City) have been 
classified into two main categories: 
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1. Earthquakes related to volcanic activity which occur in swarms with 
an average duration of three to four months. The largest event is 
rarely thE first one and its magnitude is normally under 6.5. They 
are~ however, of shallow focus and they cause considerable destruc-
tion within a radius of 30 km from the epicenter. They tend to have 
a high frequency content and the intensity depends strongly on the 
soil conditions. 
2. Larger coastal earthquakes with magnitudes up to 8 but a focal depth 
of 40 kms. They tend to have longer periods and they have not been 
historically destructive. 
Guatemala City may experience from five to seven strong motion earth-
quakes per century. The largest one was probably that of 4 January 1918, 
part of a series of shocks which started in December 1917 and which 
I -
destroyed the city. The next strongest earthquake was that of 6 August 
1942, with a magnitude of 7.75 and an epicentral distance of 137 km (of 
the coastal type). The maximum acceleration in the city was estimated 
at 0.07 to O. 16g~ the first figure being considered more reliable. 
In May 1947, a Montana instrument was installed at the Observatorio 
Nacional by the U.S.C.G.S. Reportedly eight to ten motions have been 
recorded, the largest one corresponding to the earthquake of 23 October 
1950, also of coastal origin, epicentral distance of 109 km and magnitude 
7 (recorded acceleration 0.037g). 
A recent seismic risk study conducted in relation to the design of 
the Incienso bridge had indicated for the maximum credible earthquake in 
the city a magnitude of 6.5, epicentral distance of 25 km, maximum ground 
acceleration of 0.25g, predominant frequency of 2 to 3 Hz and a return 
period of 200 to 400 years. A return period of 50 years was estimated 
for an acceleration of O.lOg. 
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It would appear that the earthquake of 4 February 1976 does not 
belong in either of the two categories mentioned above. The epicenter 
seems to have been located near the Motagua River fault some 100 kms 
northeast of the city and lateral motion has been observed along the 
fault (from 60 to 120 em) extending over 170 km. 
The folJowing is a list of some of the major earthquakes in Guatemala 
from 1530 to 1942. 
Year Location 
1530 Central Region (from Antigua to Quetzaltenango) 
1560 
1585 
1607 
1651 
1684 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
1689 Antigua 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
1717 Central Region and Antigua 
1751 Antigua 
1757 Central Region 
1765 Central Region and Quetza1tenango 
1773 Antigua (Capital moved to Guatemala City) 
1798 Guatemala City 
1846 Guatemala City 
1854 Central Region 
1863 Guatemala City 
1902 Quetzaltenango (demolished the town) 
1907 Guatemala City 
1917 
1918 
1942 
II II 
II II 
Central Region 
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EVENTS OF 4 AND 6 FEBRUARY 1976 
It was reported that a ·small foreshock was felt by some on the night 
of 2 February 1976. The main earthquake occurred some 24 hours later, on 
4 February at approximately 3 a.m. There was serious damage and general 
panic in the capital. Between 500 and 600 aftershocks took place in the 
next few days, the main one occurring on Friday, 6 February around noon. 
At least four of the aftershocks during the period 8-14 February caused 
perceptible shaking of buildings. 
As could be expected, some confusion existed originally as to the 
location of the epicenter of the main shock. The local observatory had 
placed it out south of the town, in the general area where most damaging 
earthquakes had occurred in the past. The U.S.G.S. placed it northeast of 
the city. This general location, with slight corrections, was finally 
accepted when the motions reported before were observed along the Motagua 
fault. The epicenters of the ensuing aftershocks were also located in the 
neighborhood of the fault. A Richter magnitude of 7.5 was assigned to 
the event of 4 February and about 5.5 to the second. (The first shock was 
rated at 7.9 by the U.C. Seismological Laboratory at Berkeley.) 
The instrument at the observatory was not operational for either of 
the two major events (out of paper in the first case, in the process of 
being reloaded in the second). As a result no strong motion records are 
available. Two seismoscopes were located at the University (southwest of 
the city), one in the basement, the other in the top floor. The seismo-
scope records are currently being interpreted by the U.S.G.S. Seismological 
Field Survey. 
Damage caused by the main shock was particularly severe in the central 
part of the country, with.complete destruction of all the towns immediately 
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to the north, northeast and northwest of Guatemala City. The percentage of 
destruction tapered off slowly toward the northeast (90% at El Progreso, 
60 to 80% at Zacapa), and very fast toward the south and particularly the 
southwest. The second event of 6 February caused substantial additional 
destruction and a large number of slides along highways. 
In the absence of any instrumental data at the time of writing this 
report, maximum accelerations and frequency content of the motions can 
only be estimated on the basis of the observed damage in the city. The 
maximum acceleration does not seem to have been too large, probably on the 
order of 0.20g. There was on the other hand evidence of large motions 
and many cases of hammering between buildings with adequate gaps between 
them. This would suggest a relatively long predominant period for the 
earthquake. Mercalli intensity seemed to be larger in the northern part 
of the city (estimated at VIII). 
Total losses due to the earthquakes are obviously very high. The last 
tentative figure of dead reported during the stay of the authors approached 
20,000 (some 4,000 in Guatemala City). A total of 60,000 dwellings had 
been destroyed in the city. Rescue and food distribution operations were 
carried out generally in an expedient and orderly way and by 11 February, 
a week after the main shock, activities in the city were almost back to 
normal (although many buildings had been evacuated for precautionary 
measures). An emergency committee was inspecting all public buildings and 
private engineers had organized themselves through the Camara Guatemalteca 
de la Construccion (Chamber of Construction) to conduct detailed inspection 
of all private buildings. 
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STRUCTURAL HISTORY 
It is natural to expect a considerable range in type and quality of 
construction in a city of over one million people which grew rapidly over 
the last quarter century without any regulations for structural design. 
Against that backdrop, the most striking feature of the construction in 
Guatemala City is the IIweightli of engineered construction, or the sizes 
of structural elements, in such buildings, which reflect emphatically 
the concern of the builders for earthquake effects over and above satis-
fying minimum requirements. 
Most of the moderate-rise construction in Guatemala City is of recent 
origin, concentrated around Centro Civico (Fig. 1.2) and strung along 
Reforma Avenue toward the southern part of the city. The concentration 
around Centro Civico may be seen in the background of Fig. 2.5 (viewed 
from the north) and in Fig. 2.6 (viewed from the west.) Examples of 
buildings along the Reforma are also seen in Fig. 2.7 and 2.8. There 
are approximately two dozen buildings having from ten to twenty stories 
in Guatemala City. 
Buildings having four to nine stories occur randomly throughout the 
city with relative concentrations near the Parque Central and Centro 
Civico. Various examples can be seen in Fig. 2.1 through 2.6. 
We have been told that the structural components of buildings in both 
of the above classes would have been typically sized by a structural 
engineer. All but one of the taller buildings had reinforced concrete 
structural elements with a mode design compressive strength of 4000 psi 
for recent construction with 3000-psi concrete used in the footings. There 
were cases of the use of SOOO-psi concrete in structural elements carrying 
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compressive forces. Except for a few examples of Grade 60, Grade 40 de-
formed bars (imported from Mexico or El Salvador) were used in recent 
construction, although the current trend is toward Grade 60 bars. Plain 
bars, sometimes mixed with deformed bars, were observed in some of the 
older buildings. 
For details of reinforced concrete construction, ACI Building Codes 
were used as a guide. For most of the recent buildings, the version used 
was ACI 318-63. ACI 318-71 is not yet generally used. 
Lateral forces were taken from the chronologically relevant SEAOC 
documents. 
The structural steel for the 19-story (plus three basements) Finance 
jl1inistry Building was fabricated by a subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Co. 
We have been told that this building was designed for a base shear of 
eight percent of its weight at working stresses. 
For almost all of these buildings engineering appeared very good, 
according to the best state of the art practiced at the time they were 
designed. Construction was also generally of good quality. There were 
only a few isolated instances where we encountered inadequate quality 
control of construction and materials (a new wing of the General Hospital 
San Juan de Dios, the Tikal Building and a couple of three-story buildings). 
Flexible type construction (reinforced concrete frames or columns 
with waffle slabs) predominated, with very attractive but damage-prone 
architecture. Large span cantilevers were frequent, with solid brick 
walls at their tips starting from the second or third story. Only three 
major buildings were found to rely primarily on structural walls for 
lateral resistance walls, the Banco de Guatemala (with a shear wall core 
designed to take the full lateral load), the Edificio El Cortijo, near 
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the Reforma, and a building (Fig. 2.7) in final stages of construction. 
Unreinforced adobe dominated the low-rise construction. Such 
buildings were sometimes reinforced with timber posts and lintels stiffened 
by x-bracing, the system being called IIbahareque. 1I Both types, adobe and 
bahareque, are used with large perforations for windows and doors. When 
used for small businesses, the front wall is reduced to two columns. The 
roof is typically supported by a light timber truss, the cover being 
provided by corrugated iron or simple tiles. Middle-class residences used 
concrete slabs for roofs and floors, supported by block walls with some 
reinforcement or very light reinforced concrete or masonry columns. Two-
and three-story construction often had frames with infill walls. A view 
of low-rise construction near the airport is shown in Fig. 2.9. 
SOIL FAILURES 
The city is delimited on almost all sides by steep ravines (Fig. 7.2 
and 7.3) the slopes of some of which are sites for residential construc-
tion (Fig. 7.1). A large number of small slides took place along the 
edges of the ravines (small in relation to those which occurred along 
highways north of the city, obliterating the routes for lengths of as much 
as 50 meters at a location.) Wide cracks indicating the imminence of a 
new series of slides were visible at almost all city boundaries. Minor 
slides occurred continually during the period we were in Guatemala City. 
Figure 3.1 shows a two-story residence destroyed by a slide. Note the 
minimal shaking damage to the house next door. 
Figure 3.2 shows the transmitter house for a television station 
(Channel 3) located on top of a hill (elevation, 2400 meters) northeast 
of the city. The rigid reinforced concrete box was supported in a rather 
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small central base made up of four 50 by 50-cm reinforced concrete columns 
on individual footings. Articulations which appeared to be Mesnager 
hinges were between the box and the columns. Rocking forces evidently 
caused uneven settlement of the columns, the settlement exceeding 35 cm 
for the southeast column (on the left in Fig. 3.2). Because of the dis-
tortions, the, column shells had spalled locally at the articulations, 
with extensive loss of the shell of the southeast column and damage to 
the filler walls between the columns. Failure of the building was due 
clearly to a foundation failure, which resulted from the architectural 
planning and possibly from the location of the building at the edge of a 
rather steep slope. (No cracks were observed on the slope.) 
GENERAL PATTERN OF DAMAGE 
Old buildings such as the Mercado Central, the Cathedral and several 
churches in the center of town (zone 1), suffered varying degrees of 
damage. The towers of the Cathedral were inclined (in opposite directions) 
and cracked and the facade was damaged: there was talk of demolishing the 
building. The churches of Santa Rosa and Capuchinas had the top of the 
walls (which sustained the roof) partly collapsed. The dome of the church 
of La Merced was displaced. In the Mercado Central some of the heavy adobe 
walls were cracked and partially collapsed. The walls of the Instituto 
Central de Varones (brick building also in zone 1) had collapsed carrying 
with them the roof. 
An example of damage diversity was provided by the General Hospital 
San Juan de Dios, with a combination of buildings of different ages. The 
old part, some 25 years old, was made of brick walls with timber trusses 
and a tile roof. Damage was generally limited to cracking and falling of 
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plaster from the walls and ceilings. Although this wing was evacuated, no 
serious structural damage was apparent. A new wing finished two years ago 
was made of concrete columns with waffle slabs and large cantilevers. There 
was considerable damage to the heavy brick partitions and to the structure, 
with crushing at the top of several columns (poor quality construction). 
A more recent pediatric wing (finished one year ago) had practically no 
damage. 
While there were some spectacular partial failures of engineered 
buildings (such as the Hotel Terminal or the Liceo Javier) and in a few 
cases structural and nonstructural damage could be easily observed from 
the street (El Camino Real, Cruz Azul, or the Clinicas Medicas at the end 
of the Reforma), in general most engineered buildings showed little sign 
of any distress from the outside. Almost all of them had, however, some 
non structural damage and a substantial number showed after closer inspec-
tion structural cracks, often in the beams (Ritz Intercontinental, Camara 
de Industria, Edificio Reforma Obelisco, etc.) It was apparent that lateral 
displacement of the structure had been large, certainly into the inelastic 
range of response, in all cases. An unusually large' number of cases where 
two buildings with a separation of a couple of inches had banged against 
each other could be observed. The Finance Ministry building, for example, 
had the main steel tower and a smaller reinforced concrete wing with a 
separation of six inches between them except at a few points where the gap 
was only two inches. Hammering between the two buildings occurred at 
these points at the third floor level. 
Definition of a t·1ercalli intensity is clearly very subjective. It 
depends particularly on whether buildings which were well engineered in 
the 50's and early 60 l s can still be considered today as specially designed. 
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A large fraction of small adobe, brick and bahareque one- or two-story 
houses survived the motion well in zone 1. On the other hand destruction 
of this type of building was very severe in other zones. As pointed out 
above, the ensemble of the engineered buildings in the city suffered an 
important amount of damage. Cracks in the ground were abundant in some 
parts of town. It is our opinion that a modified Mercalli intensity of 
VII is the minimum value which can be reasonably assigned to some parts 
of the city and that VIII is more realistic on the whole. (An intensity 
of IX could be claimed in certain zones). 
Damage to Buildings in the One-and Two-Story Class 
The reported loss of 60,000 residential units was in this group of 
predominantly nonengineered construction. In the parts of the city visited 
by the writers, destruction seldom amounted to a third of a given block. 
Typically, ten percent of a block was heavily damaged, districts in the 
more modern south part of the city having even a smaller average for 
houses seriously damaged, as a result of quality of construction and, 
possibly, distance from the causative fault. Damage intensity was reported 
to be particularly high in zones 3, 5, and 7 (Fig. 1.2). 
In the one- and two-story group, the record was much better for 
bahareque than for plain masonry, whether adobe or brick. Failures of 
adobe buildings appeared to have resulted from out-of-plane rather than 
in-plane forces, a result which may be related to the light roof structures 
(Fig. 4.1 and 4.3) which were not heavy enough to generate large inertia 
forces but for the same reason did not restrain the walls. 
Lightly reinforced block construction, despite the heavy concrete 
floor and roof slabs, typically survived with wall cracks indicating 
serious in-plane forces and shattered windows witnessing the distortion. 
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An impressive number of low buildings of plain masonry construction 
came through with barely a crack suggesting that the repeated II short-
frequencyll acceleration pulses in the city might not have exceeded 0.25g. 
Damage to Buildings in the Three- to Seven-Story Class 
There were a few notable collapses in this group, notable not because 
of their unusual features but rather because of their having been observed 
before and the strong likelihood of their being observed again. 
Figures 5.1 through 5.5 describe the failure of the Otutlan Church. 
It would seem that a minimal increase in cost of the structure, resulting 
from the expense for adequate splices, could have saved the church. 
The Javier Highschool (Liceo Javier) was the seat of another recurring 
failure mechanism which has been observed too many times before in the 
Caribbean as well as in other areas of the world. Figures 5.6 through 5.8 
show the collapsed portion of the school buildings while Fig. 5.9 and 5.10 
illustrate the primary cause of the failure. The reinforced concrete 
column, bounded by "nonstructural" walls, attracts considerably more shear 
than intended (because of increased overall stiffness of the structure and 
increased relative stiffness of the "captivell set of columns) and fails 
in shear because of lack of sufficient transverse reinforcement to develop 
its flexural strength in plastic hinges forming at the ends of a much 
shortened clear height. The condition shown in Fig. 5.9 is noteworthy 
because it illustrates that the wall need not fill the entire bay. Figure 
5.10 demonstrates that a discontinued partition wall can create the same 
effect. Friction between the wall and the floor may suffice to wedge the 
wall. A more extreme example is provided in Fig. 5.11. The light orna-
mental enclosure around the staircase frame provided sufficient rigidity 
and strength to tear the column from the roof slab. 
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A rather routine demonstration of the captive column was provided by 
a three-story building on Seventh Av. (Fig. 5.12). Identical failures 
were encountered in buildings of similar characteristics in various other 
parts of town. 
A more sophisticated example of the captive column was observed in 
two five-story apartment buildings. Details of the column shear failure 
are illustrated in Fig. 5.13 and 5.14. While in the photograph (Fig. 
51.13) the inclined crack is visible only in the left column, these cracks 
existed in various widths in all but one of the edge columns in the first 
and second stories. It is evident that the nonstructural infill wall 
transformed the interior bay of the edge frames into a structural wall 
which may actually have been beneficial to the comportment of the buildings 
during the earthquakes. However, the concentrated distortion of the wall 
over the height of the slit window initiated the shear failure of the 
columns. 
The most dramatic collapse in Guatemala City was that of the six-story 
Hotel Terminal (Fig. 5.15 through 5.20). The building can be described as 
a four-story tower on a two-story base which covers a larger area in plan. 
The tower frame had only one bay in the short direction. This bay was 
stiffened appreciably in the top three floors by end walls required by the 
architectural plan (Fig. 5.15 and 5.16). Thus, the third floor, immediately 
on top of the larger two-story base, was transformed into a flexible link 
in the vertical plane. To aggravate an already bad condition, the location 
of the kitchen on the north end of the building in the third floor placed 
an infill wall at that end (Fig. 5.16 and 5.18) plus other walls around 
the stairs (Fig. 5.17) while the south frames were left completely open 
because of the dining hall. The frames around the dining hall thus were 
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made the flexible link twice, in the vertical and horizontal planes. 
The collapse of the columns in the dining hall area occurred in 
stages. According to eyewitnesses there was a major lurch of the build-
ing during the main event of 4 February. Partial destruction of the 
columns (possibly limited sliding along inclined cracks) were IIfelt ll 
about 20 minutes after the main shock. However, the columns were still 
supporting the upper three stories. Complete collapse of the story took 
place during the 6 February shock. The reported progressive mechanism 
fits in with the hypothesis of shear failure of the columns as does the 
structural state of the building before the earthquakes. However, the 
conditions of the failed columns (Fig. 5.19 and 5.20) do not permit 
irrefutable diagnosis. Furthermore, there was little permanent distortion 
of the fourth-floor slabs in the horizontal plane, which does not discount, 
but also does not confirm the existence of torsional instability suggested 
by the distribution of llnonstructural ll walls. There were, however, 
inclined cracks in the third row of columns (from the south end of the 
building) at the failure level. The columns on the north end were intact. 
Hotel Terminal was designed in the late fifties when the requirement 
of providing sufficient shear strength in columns to resist the shear 
corresponding to flexural hinges at both ends had not been publicized and 
certainly not required. But it would appear that the shear failure result-
ing from lack of heavy transverse reinforcement was the culmination and 
not the trigger of the overall failure mechanism which must be related to 
the distortion of the structural action by architectural requirements. 
Damage to Moderate-Rise Buildings 
Two buildings, which may also be seen in Fig. 2.2, in which lateral-
load resistance was provided primarily by frames, comprising columns and 
lS 
thick flat slabs (hollow), are shown in Fig. 6.1 (Horizontal 1, eight 
stories) and 6.2-6.3 (Cruz Azul, eleven stories). Both buildings survived 
the earthquakes without collapse (slab failures seen in Fig. 6.2 were 
caused by impact of walls falling from upper floors). Both ended up with 
permanent displacements. Both had serious architectural damage. 
It could be said that the architectural damage was prescribed by the 
choice of the structural scheme: a relatively light frame. The amount of 
inelastic response in the "beamll elements was indicated by cracks, near the 
columns, having residual widths of approximately O.S mm going all the way 
through the depth of the slab. The structures were, in effect, successes 
in relation to the implicit design philosophy. They had ridden out a 
moderately strong motion by developing moderate IIductility.1I Whether the 
design criterion is a desirable one is debatable. A more plausible 
demonstration of this design criterion was provided by a medical clinic 
building on the Reforma south of Centro Civico (Fig. 6.4). The eleven-
story building had a moderate core and a relatively heavy frame comprising 
tied columns and thick waffle slabs. The structure survived the earthquakes 
with barely a scratch but the brick skin of the building and the partition 
walls had enough cracks and failures in them to make the local journalists 
use photographs of the building as an example of a critically damaged 
structure. 
The structural failures in the ten-story building of the Hotel Camino 
Real (Fig. 6.5) are only of narrow interest because of the special 
1I1attice" or II perforated shear wall" that was used to resist shears in the 
long direction of the building which was curved in plan and had an expan-
sion joint in the middle of the long dimension. The hotel was built in 
two stages, the top five stories having been added after about eight years 
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following the initial construction in 1966. Structural walls and frames 
resisted the lateral loads in the short dimension of the building. 
The struts forming the lattice on the convex face of the building are 
shown in Fig. 6.5 and 6.6. In this face, failures occurred in all struts 
in the first story inclining from west (top) to east (bottom). The location 
of the failures near the' joints indicates influence of bending and/or 
splices. A closeup is shown in Fig. 6.7. The struts measured 50 by lB cm 
as built in cross section and the strut shown was reinforced by four No. B 
bars at the corners and by a combination of No. 6 and No. 5 bars at mid-
section near each long face .. The No. 3 ties had 90-deg. bends with 
B-diameter extensions. The minimum strength of the concrete was reported 
to be 5000 psi. The struts on the concave face of the building are shown 
by the overlapping photographs in Fig. 6.B and 6.9. There was only one 
strut failure (Fig. 6.B). 
It must be noted that although some elements of the perforated wall 
or lattice had failed, the architectural details of the building were in 
good condition. 
The 15-story (plus two basements) Camara de Industria building (Fig. 
10) has a central tower supported by four main core-like columns (Fig. 
6. lOa and b) and a structurally integral rear portion which uses a 
structural wall (Fig. 6.10c) for lateral forces in one direction. An 
interesting structural feature is the connecting girder of variable depth 
(Fig. 6.10c) at the first-floor facade, a configuration which stiffened one 
of the main columns with respect to the others leading to a complex of 
t'esidual inclined cracks with thicknesses of the order of 0.5mm in that 
column. (According to a security guard in the building, these cracks 
existed before 4 February but were much finer). Figure 6. 11 shows the 
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inclined cracks on both sides of one of the girders framing into a main 
column. 
Bridges 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the Incienso bridge which crosses a ravine 
on the north side of the city. It is a prestressed concrete bridge with a 
main span of approximately 120 m. Hammering damage at the meeting points 
of the approach spans and main girder indicated total maximum relative 
movement of approximately 30 cm in the transverse direction but a permanent 
relative displacement of only 2 cm. 
The Ascuncion bridge, a steel girder, had a permanent lateral displace-
ment of about 40 cm because of the girder being shifted off its supports 
(Fig. 7.3). 
The reported site of a bridge collapse (Aguas Calientes) approximately 
25 km from the city, was not visited. 
SUMMARY 
A 7.g-magnitude earthquake associated with an approximately 175-km 
surface fault devastated central and eastern regions of Guatemala on 
4 February 1976, causing heavy structural damage (Mercalli VIII) in 
Guatemala City, the capital of the country with a population of over one 
million. A particularly severe aftershock on 6 February 1976 caused 
additional damage in the city. 
There has been no direct measurements of the ground motion in 
Guatemala City. A seismoscope record, not yet reduced, may give an 
indication of the maxima in the southern edge of the city. Judging crudely 
on the basis of damage to engineered and nonengineered structures, it 
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would appear that the spectral response to the motion in town could have 
been on the order of three quarters of that to the north component of the 
1940 El Centro record with a relatively depressed portion in the nearly-
constant-acceleration range of response. 
The engineered construction in town was designed and built to resist 
strong ground shaking on'the basis of recent concepts of earthquake 
engineering. Its overall record was excellent. The significance of the 
observed performance depends, of course, on how strong the ground motion 
was in the city. 
Insofar as the behavior of engineered construction is concerned, 
three strong impressions emanate from a superficial inspection of the damage 
in Guatemala City: 
*That architecture can destroy the structure was once again demon-
strated in Guatemala City. Passing over the problem of changes introduced 
into the overall stiffness of a building by architectural decisions as 
being too abstruse for a general conclusion (Fig. 5.15-5.20), the much-too-
obvious problem of the captive column (Fig. 5.6-5.14) must be flagged. 
It does not take analysis to reveal the captive column, often a feature 
of institutional buildings in temperate climates. It would seem incumbent 
upon local building authorities in earthquake-prone regions to identify 
these details in high-occupancy buildings and, as a minimum, inform the 
occupants of the risks involved. 
*The long span (over 8m) frame girders of some of the moderate-rise 
structures developed critical inclined cracks suggesting that a larger 
amount of web reinforcement would have been appropriate. (In one case, 
these cracks might have been initiated by cut-off longitudinal reinforce-
ment.) These phenomena should be studied and documented because of their 
possible impact on current detailing practice. 
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*As after the Managua experience of 1972, observations in Guatemala 
City (Fig. 6.1-6.4) raised questions about the economic feasibility of 
the "ductile frame II even though it was also demonstrated that if the frame 
is heavy enough, it can ride our an earthquake of moderate intensity with 
minimal damage to the architecture (Fig. 6.13). In contrast, responses 
of the few structures relying on walls for lateral resistance were con-
sistently superior (Fig. 6.14). 
The general features of the heavy construction in Guatemala City 
compare favorably with those of similar construction in the U.S. and else-
where. Detailed analyses of the behavior of some of the buildings in 
Guatemala City are essential for improvement of current design concepts. 
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Legend for Fig. 1.2 
1. Lo de Bran - Residential area. Puente del Incienso. 
2. Hospital General. 
3. Cathedral. 
4. Cruz Azul, Camara de Comercio, Edificio Tikal, Edificio 
Horizontal, Edificio He~rera 
5. Hotel Ritz Intercontinental 
6. Civic Center: Ministerio de Finanzas, Banco de Guatemala, 
Corte Suprema, Tribunales 
7. Camara de Industria 
8. Hotel Terminal. 
9. Hotel El Camino Real, Edificio Reforma Obelisco 
/ / 
1 0 0 C 1 i n i cas ~1 e d i cas 
11. Edificio TV 3, modern church 
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Fig. 2.1 Looking North from Hotel Ritz-Intercontinental (Heavy lowrise building, left background, is the 
National Palace. The dome on the right belongs to the Cathedral.) 
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Fig. 2.4 Looking Southwest from Hotel Ritz-Intercontinental (The volcano in center background is 
the Agua. The two peaks on the right are Fuego, an active volcano~and Acatenango. ) 
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Fig. 2.5 Looking South from Hotel Ritz-Intercontinental (Highest building is the 
19-story Ministry of Finance Building which marks the location of Centro 
Civico. Two peaked volcanic mountain in lright background is the Pacaya which 
is currently active.) 
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Fig. 2.7 A New Moderate Rise Building to House Hedical Clinics. (The steel tower is the "Torre Reformador.") 
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Fig. 3.2 Northwest View of the Transmitter House for Television Station Ch. 3 Located on a Hilltop 
(elevation 7700 ft) West of the City. (Note tubular conduit, straight before the earthquake, 
which emphasizes the settlement and tilt resulting from foundation failure.) 
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Fig. 4.2 Texture of Adobe Wall 
Fig. 4.3 Fallen Parapet (Note absence of cracks, related 
to in-plane forces, in wall) 
39 
..s:: 
u 
s... 
::l 
..s:: 
u 
s::: 
ro 
+J 
::l 
+J 
o 
LO 
1 
: 
40 
or-
>-
.j.J 
Ul 
n::s 
OJ 
..c 
.j.J 
S-
o 
z: 
N 
L.(") 
41 
or-
I..J... 
42 
;....') 
(/) 
co 
I.J.J 
en 
c 
or-
..::.::: 
o 
o 
......J 
(/) 
(/) 
;:j 
5.. 
l-
I+-
o 
o 
0:::: 
en 
or-
l.L.. 
43 
Fig. 5.5 Otutlan Church, Column Splices 
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Fig. 5.7 Jlavier High School, Detail of Failure (Note class room furniture supporting upper-story) 
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Fig. 5.9 Javier High School, Shear Failures in First-Sto~ Columns (Note that (1) the partition wall is not 
solid and (2) inclined cracks in interior column have formed in both directions (x-pattern) while the 
inclined crack in the corner collumn indicates shear failure in one direction, the direction in which 
part of the column is stiffened by the wall. 
Fig. 5.10 Javier High School, Shear Failure in First-Story Column 
(Note that partition wall does not bear on another column) 
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Fig. 5.14 Inclined Crack in First-Story Column 
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Fig. 5.18 Hotel Terminal, Third-Floor, Kitchen, North End 
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Fig. 5.19 Hotel Terminal, Third Floor, Dining Room, 
South End 
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Fig. 6.1 Horizontal 1 
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Figure 6.2 Cruz Azul Building, Northeast 
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Fig. 6.6 Hotel Camino Real, Southeast 
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Fig. 6.11 Camara de Industria, Girders 
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APPENDIX 
NOTES ON STRUCTURES VISITED AND OBSERVED DM~AGE 
1. Lo de Bran - Residential area in zone 3. Two story private houses. 
Several located near the edge of the ravine failed because of slides. 
First floor collapsed. People sleeping in second floor went down with 
the ho~se. No casualties reported. 
2. Mercado Central. Old building (zone 1) with heavy adobe walls (0.60 
to 1m thick in ~arts). Timber roof with corrugated metal sheet. 
Partial collapse of some outside walls. 
3. Instituto Central de Varones (zone 1) Brick walls collapsed bringing 
down roof with them. 
4. Cathedral. (zone 1) Towers -incl ined in opposite directions. Damage 
to facade. Talk of demolishing it. Had already suffered damage in 
1917-18 earthquakes. 
5. Churches of Santa Rosa and Capuchinas (zone 1). Both damaged. Top 
portions of walls collapsed. Vertical separation on facade of 
Capuchinas. 
6. Church of La Merced (zone 1). Dome displaced. 
7. General Hospital San Juan de Dios (zone 1 toward zone 3). Combination 
of buildings of different ages. Evacuated, old part (25 years old) 
with brick walls and timber roof structure with tiles: plaster 
cracked and fallen from walls and ceilings. 15-year old wing with 
concrete columns. Cracks in partitions and brick walls. Lintel over 
one door broken. New 2 year old wing - Concrete columns with waffle 
slab and heavy brick partitions. Cracked partitions, crushing of 
top of several columns (bad construction). Pediatric wing (1 year 
old). 2 story building - no apparent damage. 
8. Adobe, bahareque and brick low rise construction. Collapse of about 
5 to 10% of these buildings in zone 1, serious damage to another 5 or 
10%. More damage in other zones (3, 5 and 7). 
9. Transmitting station of TV3. Two story structure on top of a hill. 
Top story a rigid block on four inside columns. Foundation failure. 
10. Otutlan Church. r10dern church southwest of city. Total collapse of 
roof. Lack of adequate splices in columns. 
11. Synagogue. Modern shell roof in 7th Avenue near Reforma. A small 
crack on one of the supporting legs of the shell. Internal structure 
with large slab resting on isolated columns (large cantilevers and 
spans). Some damage, hammering against shell. Damage at the staircase. 
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12. El Patio - Modern 2 story shopping center on 7th Avenue. Concrete 
columns. Staggered brick columns in first block crushed. Cracked 
brick partitions. Some hammering at expansion joints. Shear crack 
in one beam. 
13. Liceo Javier - Modern private school (built 1963) 3 wings (3 stories). 
In one of the w~ngs complete collapse of second floor over central 
part of building. Captive column problem. Collapsed story had 
classrooms. Third story dormitory. People in dormitory but no 
casualties. One person reportedly had time to step out of the room 
and into,adjacent portion of building before collapse occurred. 
14. Edificio San Remo (Zaror). ,5 story apartment buildings. Concrete 
frame with brick infil1. Each building consists of two blocks with 
intermediate (separate) elevator-staircase core. Variation ,of 
captive column problem. Some hammering and partition damage. 
15. Main building TV3 (southwest of town, near Otutlan Church). Concrete 
frame brick infi11s. Damage to staircase, cracked partitions. One 
broken captive column. 
16. Cruz Azul (zone 1). Concrete columns with cantilevering waffle slabs. 
Flexural cracks on slab along edge, of capitals. Breakage and falling 
Ollt (in hlnrk~) of extprior brick walls. Cracks in interior oartitionsL 
- - - \" .. - - - - . ~ - I _. - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -. - - - - - - - - - - - - - I· I 
Elevator-staircase box separate tower. Hammering between two buildings. 
Gap between them widening at top (one of the buildings leaning away from 
the other). 
17. Edificio Horizontal Uno - Similar to Cruz Azul and close by. Similar 
problems. Consider~ble interior damage. 
18. Edificio Herrera - Similar construction, nearby. Two blocks with 
connecting elevator-staircase tower. Surprisingly small damage.(light 
interior partitions), mostly in connecting tower. 
19. Torre Clinicas Medicas (at the end of Reforma). Concrete col.umns, 
waffle slabs cantilevering. Almost no structur~l damage. Considerable 
damage to outside shell (brick walls and glazing on tip of canti-
levering slabs), two interior partitions and two false ceilings 
(badly buckled). 
20. C1inica Medica. New building using primarily structural walls 
(construction almost finished) nearby on 7th Avenue. Stiff ,building. 
Minor damage (some interior cracking). Some settlement of sur-
rounding fill. 
21. Camara de Comercio (zone 1). Concrete frame with columns outside 
building. Longitudinal beams recessed (along facade). Short 
transverse beams framing into longitudinal beams and columns. 
Inclined (shear) cracks in short beams. Minor flexural cracks in 
columns. Cracking of brick walls in staircase box and substantial 
damage to exterior brick walls (particularly at the corners of the 
building). 
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22. Hotel Terminal. Collapse of one floor with (reported) progressive 
shear failure of the columns. Failure caused by a combination of 
reasons discussed in text. 
23. Edificio Tikal (zone 1). Damage to 1st story columns (crushed) and 
to walls. Building with a long history of problems (construction 
interrupted for many years, finished only recently). Bad quality 
construction and materials. 
24. E1 Camino Real (Reforma Avenue). Ten-story hotel, curved in plan 
with concrete lattice in longitudinal curved directions. Breakage 
of all struts in first story of concave side, one strut on convex 
side. Little to moderate interior damage. See text. 
25. Biltmore Hotel. Adjoining El Camino Real. Damage to some partitions, 
only moderate. Failure in shear of one column. 
26. Hotel Ritz Continental (zone 1). Very little damage on the outside 
(falling of some marble from columns) Considerable damage to interior 
partitions in hours 4 to 7 .. Shear cracks on longitudinal beams on 
one side of building 14th and 5th floors and both sides on 3rd floor. 
Outside staircase with vertical metal struts buckled (situation 
progressing). 
27. Edificio Reforma Obelisco. (Reforma Avenue, Zone 9, near El Camino 
Real). 17-story reinforced concrete frame - Damage on brick partitions 
staircase box. False ceiling of 4th floor partly collapsed. Shear 
cracks in girders of 3rd and 4th floors. 
28. Camara de Industria. l5-floors reinforced concrete frame with 
combination of two-way and one-way slabs. Inclined cracks on two 
main columns at ground level. Elevator-staircase tower separate 
tower with shear wall on one side and short beams connecting to main 
building. Shear cracks in these short beams. Shear and flexural 
cracks in girders of main building. 
29. Corte Suprema and Tribunales (Civic Center). Concrete columns and 
waffle slabs. Two buildings of different heights connected to each 
other. Joint between them with corrugated infi1l worked very well. 
Light damage in short building (Corte Suprema) to false ceilings, 
and cracked plaster. Some corner cracks in brick infill and cracks 
in architectural facade. No apparent structural damage. Tribunales 
building had only minor damage in brick walls of elevator and stair-
case boxes. Marble fell down from one wall of staircase box in the 
lower floors. Stiff building with L-shaped corner columns. No 
structural damage. 
30. Banco de Guatemala (Civic Center) l5-story modern (12-year old) 
concrete building with waffle slabs. Elevator-staircase core 
designed as structural shear walls for full lateral load. No structural 
damage, very minor nonstructural damage with small cracks on brick 
walls adjoining elevator core from 9th floor up. Some cracks on 
outside walls of 6th floor. In an adjoining auditorium problems had 
been experienced during construction (cantilever deflected and had 
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to be propped by steel columns) .. Partitions were broken, one of 
the main beams had a serious shear crack (it exi~ted as a hairline 
crack before but opened considerably during the earthquake) and the 
folded plate roof running transversely had cracks especially near 
the columns. Some of the ceiling panels had fallen down. 
31. Ministerio de Finanzas. Only major structural steel building in town. 
19 stories, in Civic Center. Construction almost finished. No 
damage except for some hammering with adjoining 7 story concrete 
building in spite of a joint with two-in. gap. 
32. Edificio· E1 Cortijo. Not inspected. Shear walls. Very little damage 
reported. 
33. Incienso Bridge. Elegant prestressed concrete bridge in zone 3 
(Lo de Bran). Very tall piers. Continuous central span and simply 
supported lateral spans. Considerable motion, hammering at joints 
and some permanent separation (less than one in.). Motion mainly 
longitudinal but also transvers~. One abutment partly broken, pulled 
away by the longitudinal motion of the superstructure because of 
debris wedged in between. 
34. Asuncion Bridge. Steel girders on concrete piers. Considerable 
lateral, transverse and torsional motion. Cracks on ground near one 
end of bridge with evidence of slides. Out of service. 
35. Aguas Ca1ientes Bridge. Some 25 km outside of town. Not visited. 
Bridge on curve. Collapse of steel superstructure reported. 
